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Abstract
The sense of the intact and the deconstruction of the self: Story as 
redemptive mediation
The notion o f  s e l f  is p o se d  as a  problem atic  which m ay fru itfu lly  be 
approached  by a  d o se  exam ination o f  the m eaning o f  what story  is. The 
prob lem atic  is reso lved  to som e extent by the argum ent that story  
encom passes both the sense o f  the intact a n d  the trace o f  decom truction . 
B ecause the s e l f  indicates not only the em pirical but also the num inous and  
ineffable, its relation to story is considered in term s o f  redem ptive value.
The m ediative values o f  story are d iscussed  by  referring  to the s e l f  as 
writer, reader a n d  narrative. Because story o ffers an  endless p o ssib ility  o f  
im age a n d  sequence, its co-dependence w ith s e l f  o ffers hope, possibility, 
a n d  consequently, an  im m inent redemption.
1. Introductory
The trite but essential aphorism on which this article is based is that life is 
indivisible. The persuasion o f vitalism is difficult to overcome even if it is 
granted that it is cerebral activity which has wrought the greatest changes in 
humanity. If this starting point is accepted, it becomes clear that language 
remains problematic, the discussion o f which consequently proliferates in the 
spheres o f both linguistic theory and literary theory. These spheres o f theory are 
enabled and constructed further, as insights and comments continue with 
structural formation o f these two established pillars o f perspectives on language. 
Thus they remain firm areas o f abstruse scholarship and deliver few ideas 
powerful enough to make influential impact in any general way beyond academic 
discussion.
The purpose is to pose the question o f what is left intact at this time in post­
modern life. If academic discourse is permitted to become a mere fragment o f 
life, obscured within specialisation, obfuscated by personal agenda and private
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purpose, it clearly loses the import o f attempting to grapple with the inscrutable 
mysteries o f life.
I am interested in the solid refusal -  the noli me tangere -  made by the ir­
reducible phenomenon o f the defiant self which baffles because o f the limitations 
o f intellectual questing. It is tme that Christ offered this refusal in connection 
with his resurrected body before any assumption had been made. The question of 
whether the resurrected self has any relevance to the deconstructed self may not 
be impertinent. But if  the self can be processed in both (and possibly more) of 
these amazing ways, the word loses integrity and becomes a psychic strategy 
instead of a spiritual unity. The incorruptible self then becomes something o f a 
Holy Grail to which my being-in-itself is bound by quest rather than experience.
If I am a disciple o f Gramsci, I admit that my sense o f self is entirely contextual, 
that I can be distanced from the hegemonic, and simply play the institutional 
games from a lofty viewpoint o f  disengagement and consequent emancipation. 
For the professional teacher, loyalty to the intact is imperative. It is the definition 
o f the intact which is problematic. Academic and scientific research, especially at 
the conceptual level, that refuses to be touched to the quick, misses its own 
intrinsic ethic. Yet, by definition, the intact remains intact either by deliberate or 
unconscious choice.
Nevertheless I wish to affirm that the irreducible aspect of the self is not entirely 
inscrutable. It seems to me that De Sausurre’s time-honoured distinction between 
langue and parole  has been appropriated without due concern for and recognition 
o f the organic integrity which exists as intrinsic basis for this distinction. That 
organic unity may be explored by examining the self-consciousness and un-self­
consciousness o f the self paradoxically within the impulses and cognition o f the 
vital body, at once producing hegemonic and emancipatory awareness.
Academia does her students a disservice if she does not instill in them the 
paradoxical mixture o f passion and precision in reading and interpreting the text 
o f their individual experience. Reader-response theory impresses on us that such 
reading and interpreting are not passive but in fact, world-constructing, or, a term 
which is more modest, formative.
But how is the “ irreducible s e lf ’ to be approached? In the Zen tradition, 
Bankei’s “Unborn” remains inscrutably clear. In humanistic psychology, Roger’s 
“becoming” indicates the value of significant personal change. In the Christian 
perspective, the idea o f incarnation brings home to this body, these hands, this 
skin, this alertness- and awareness-producing serotinin within, the organic unity 
of body, soul and spirit.
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I would like to suggest that the defiant self, subdued beneath obfuscation and 
deferment, finds a  voice in the creativity which is the genesis o f  literature. 
Defiantly, creatively, the intangible announces its presence in the virgin paper of 
the unborn and the waverings o f  becoming. Resting in the vehicle not o f  analytic 
discourse but o f  story it finds contact with the formative constraints o f time and 
being. The current practice o f  using fiction as a model for philosophical process 
indicates that the story-tellers and writers may have at their disposal a natural 
means o f going where philosophers, in all their history, desired to but could not
go-
Thus what is at stake here is an understanding o f what story means. Such an 
understanding will be approached from the perspective o f bibliotherapy, the field 
in which meaningfulness and story seek not only contact but indeed fruition as a 
result o f the effort o f  human integrity to express the inexpressible.
2. Foundational concepts of story
An important shift underlying the field is the move from the book, as such, to the 
story, the dynamic o f engagement between mind and narrative. In the view of 
Stutterheim and Pretorius, bibliotherapy need not be strictly related to book form.
Bibliotherapy can be defined as the use of printed or non-printed material, 
fictitious or didactic. It is a process of interaction between reader and 
reading matter aiding the therapeutic process (Stutterheim & Pretorius,
1993:9).
It is contended that this definition is an oversimplification: the process is not 
simply between “reader and reading-material” . The reading material, or more 
specifically, story, has therapeutic value rooted in the ontic structures o f 
consciousness, incorporating affective as well as cognitive structures. The crucial 
issue is to ask what sort o f  a concept story is. Theories o f  narratology (e.g. 
Labov, Bremonde, Genette, Greimas) and theories o f  psychoanalysis (e.g. Freud, 
Jung) are too prolific to review succinctly for the purpose o f  offering analysis o f 
theoretical compatibility o f a multitude o f points o f  departure. W hat is at stake is 
the uncovering o f  meta-theoretical constructs o f story. It may be fruitful to regard 
the underpinnings o f  story as organic rather than structural. This means to say 
that the essential story, the mylhos is a Gestalt and that to analyse, dissect or 
otherwise disturb its intrinsic cohesion is to arrive not at an understanding o f 
story, but o f  a dismembered and dead body. Edwards (1984) defers funda­
mentally to subjectivity when he refers not outside o f  but within the mythos to 
carry out an understanding o f  story. His poetics o f story is not an analysis, but a 
deepening o f  sensitivity to mythic origins.
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Story, as the fiction o f  a fallen w orld rem ade, is in fact alw ays in danger o f  
losing the world by substituting itself, w hatever its intention, o f  eventually  
d issatisfying its readers through its unreality  (Edw ards, 1984:90).
Josipovici (1973:48-49) falls with equal helplessness back to mythic rather than 
narrative values o f  story in discovering his meta-theory: “ In order to help man 
see where his salvation lies God has written two books. The first o f  these is the 
Book o f  Scripture, which reveals to those who read it aright the working o f God 
in man’s history.”
There is, however, a second book o f which God is the author, as Josipovici 
suggests: “ ... the Book o f Nature ... As God works through history, so he works 
through the world around us.”
Marshack (1972:283) suggests that story is not merely a schema o f  narrative, but 
in fact a cognitive tool which finds a correlate in brain functionality. It is that 
natural path between experience and consciousness which has been (fortuitously) 
carved into stone and written on paper.
Far from finding its origin in a technology of mind, story is more like that which 
has resulted in an awareness which depends on a genesis which is both inter- and 
intra-personal. The poetics o f story are not to be teased into a definition of 
advent: they are to find a way into the natural world, not the false world o f 
striving mankind, but the created world o f the Creator by a grace which fascinates 
and captures the alertness o f the individual to himself. To put this in another way, 
the intellectual quest cannot be divorced from the whole o f meaningfulness and 
isolated in an ambitious but necessarily fruitless way, but must find a harmony 
with a spiritual context which is to be perceived subjectively.
Egan (1989:2) states that “the story form is a cultural universal ... the story is not 
just some casual entertainment: it reflects a basic and powerful form in which we 
make sense o f the world and experience” .
The relation between story and salvation may not be entirely tenuous. Although it 
takes a considerable leap from the conceptual to the spiritual, this is the exact 
place where the individual finds the invitation to participate in the writing o f his 
own fiction. Such an ultimately demanding but subtle task may be deferred only 
by an overwhelming historiography. This means to say that meaning is no 
abstraction but a fundamentally individual experience o f  ultimacy. W here such a 
sense o f ultimacy capitulates to a self absorbed by the mass, or an in­
stitutionalised self, or a conceptualised self that does not know the freedom o f the 
imagination, the story may be said to be incomplete. The sense o f beginning and 
ending which are necessary elements o f story are recognised to the extent that 
they are recognised by the artistry not o f ponderous logic but the sharpness of 
intuition. A more direct way of putting this is to say that the enlightening story,
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the crux o f realisation which is always just out o f reach but which breaks into 
verbalised awareness from time to time needs an approach not o f deliberate and 
clumsy demystification but o f a more humble honouring.
The story is found when it is honoured by the imagination. The imagination 
relaxes into the story. No amount o f scientific hammering will yield any story. 
This kind of affirmation serves as challenge not to the validity but to the authority 
of scientific discourse. Put more bluntly, it may be stated thus: the ultimate 
paradigm of discovery and knowledge is not one o f adherence to depersonalised 
analysis o f structured and patterned concepts thus forming a theoretical view, but 
by active participation in the uncontrolled and gratuitous formation of the 
negotiable construct, the self. Essentially, story  is the story o f the self.
3. Story and self
Nell’s comprehensive work, Lost in a Book (1988), sets out the various levels of 
neurological arousal and descriptions o f mood which prevail when one engages 
with story (Nell, 1988:199-225). The point to be made here is that these levels 
and descriptions strongly suggest a relativisation o f identity to mood and altered 
states o f consciousness. The firm attachment between mood and language may 
be a suitable point at which to locate the rubric -  the story -  o f individual 
meaning. The noli me tangere, no matter whether construed as the disappearing 
laughter of the trickster, the unapproachable virgin, or the secrets o f the old 
fathers, is the secret which the self holds dear and will not surrender except in 
oblique ways. One cannot switch on the floodlight to exorcise the demon of 
distrust. Nor does one walk on water to disaffect the demon o f unbelief As in 
Yeats’ Long-Legged Fly, the mind that moves upon silence is the mind that 
attempts to penetrate the intact, and finds that it is not action, but contemplation 
which discovers the inexpressible things o f the self.
The self is the truest image of God in which mankind is made because o f its 
intense privacy and yet its vivid generosity o f possibility. Its proliferate capacity 
for relationship, imagination and creativity is matched by its stubborn refusal to 
yield up its hidden heart. All stories are stories o f the self, reflecting the mundane 
and the magnificent, the intense and the diffident. No argument can suffice to 
establish the validity of such a claim, since faith, at this point, is persuaded not by 
logical conclusiveness, but by a creative act o f imagination.
Does deconstructing the self penetrate the sanctity o f the self? The discussion of 
the self finds interest largely within religious and phenomenal contexts; there 
have also been those like Hume who have denied the self a sensate location and 
have relegated it to the abstract and ineffable. In the Hindu tradition o f  “That art 
thou” , the Brahman-Atman synthesis, the self and God are identified as one. In 
the Christian tradition, the self has been regarded as a nexus o f evil which must
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be surrendered to the Spirit o f Christ for the work o f redemption. St. Paul in his 
letter to the Romans attempts to deal categorically with the self and finds that the 
position is wretched because o f the inability to choose conclusively either for 
good or for evil without the gracious intervention o f Christ. Zen teaching has it 
that the illusory boundaries o f the self are banished in the inarticulate experience 
o f Satori, the enlightenment to the obvious.
So while philosophy must find the word abstruse, and religious viewpoints offer a 
variety o f positions, literature signals the presence o f the self in medias res, 
contemplating, reflecting and communicating. Noli me tangere is the hallmark 
not only of human presence but also o f the questions put to the expression o f 
human presence. The difference is one o f style: while critical theory prowls and 
stalks, creativity dances, sings and plays. The sense o f the intact self is currently 
challenged by the imperative not only to contextualise but also textualise the self. 
But if the self is to be textualised, the discourse, words and linguistic clues are 
bound by rhetoric, the coherent and cohesive sense o f which is the irreducible 
mystique o f the self. The argument here is that the self is revealed when its story 
is told. Psychotherapists will have no fight with the statement that the self is 
highly and often unconsciously selective about telling its story, even to itself. The 
key issue here is that o f risk. Proven theory knows no risk: that is the precise 
point o f its scientific status. But this is not the methodology o f  the forming self. 
The reified self is a mere caricature o f  the self: the saved self is not the living, 
struggling self poised on the edge between preverbalisation and the declared, 
done and dead, no-more-excited self. The discussed self is not worth discussing 
and the analysed self is truly in need o f  redemption. The story, the mythos o f the 
self is not the self but the disappearance o f the self into the (spiritual) world 
which is the context o f the self. The mythos, the avenue o f escape, is the text, the 
linguistic signals o f the story which tells o f the trace o f the self. Thus the self is 
never the living, slipping and sliding self. The moment it is spoken o f it becomes 
the crucified self, in danger o f a bright-eyed and determined theory o f self. Killed 
off by discourse, it is better left dead, to await the resurrection o f a glimpsed 
recognition which honours the fact that the dead are beyond grasp.
The clear point to emerge from this attempt to allude to the unapproachable self is 
that the mystertum  o f the self and the mysterium  o f story are mutually implied. 
That human awareness cannot be reduced to theoretical constructs does not imply 
that the margin o f experience between awareness and spirituality is un- 
discussable. For any amount o f fruitful or fruitless purposes, self, story, 
experience and spirituality may be discussed. But that is not the point. The point 
is that story is praxis, an indicator o f context and activation within context. To 
ask what the context o f story is, is to head directly for the limits o f  language. On 
a theoretical basis, the more comprehensive approaches may well be found in the 
discourse o f cognitive anthropology, beginning with Lévi-Strauss (1973) and
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moving from there to contemporary writers such as Marshack (1972) or Bloch 
(1991). The purpose of story is not to abstract but to change, in fundamental 
ways, the typically human sense o f self. Ascribing such change to artistry, 
Padavano (1979:6) puts the matter thus:
H ow  do we change the vision o f  the people? It is love that art and religion 
have m ost in com m on. The artist convinces us o f  the truth by  dealing with 
us holistically. A rtists try to m ake us feel the truth. Good art gets the truth 
inside us on a level deeper than the surface o f  our m inds. O n this level, 
truth is m ost irresistible. The m ind m ay not only resist the truth bu t m ay 
even accept it and keep it at a personal distance. Logical convictions are 
not necessarily  existential imperatives. The artist m akes us nostalgic for the 
beauty w e have m issed, the life w e have forfeited, the m eaning w hich 
som ehow  eluded our grasp. Art haunts us with the spectre o f  a lost 
hum anity and bids us return to paradise.
Thus the hallmark o f effective story is irrevocable change within the conscious­
ness o f the individual. The essence o f story is the residue of irrevocable trace, an 
amalgam o f thought, belief, mood and attitude. Although story may lead to 
intellectual and emotional conviction, it is not to be equated with conviction, 
since it is a praxis o f the imagination, which is independent o f logic. The 
question o f whether conviction is to be regarded as rational or irrational is 
pertinent at this point. The question may be answered in this way: since in­
formation is always incomplete, axiomatically, conviction must always involve 
premature closure. Closure, however, is a function o f rationality. Imagination 
knows nothing o f closure. Story does not convert, it merely changes. Story, as 
focus and vehicle of change, eclipses the self at the intense risk o f the anomie of 
impersonality. Thus the enigma of the unconscious marriage between story and 
self defies definition and can only be expressed in the surprising movement o f the 
present. The philosophical issue is not the question o f priority o f existence or 
essence but the issue o f experience needing a mediating rubric. According to 
M arshack (1972:133) Stone Age man knew no discontinuity between explanation 
and story. The essential mbric o f explanation which story serves has not 
changed, although human mentality certainly has. The problem o f discussing 
contemporary story, within the fashionability o f post-modernism, is the problem 
o f change itself being so elusive that intellectual activity becomes a logjam, not 
because o f a lack o f impulse or movement, but because o f a proliferation o f subtle 
data. Story, however, does not take cerebral activity as a sole starting point. 
Organically constituted, story follows the geography o f the body, moving 
between awareness and image, accountable to the intellect only on the basis o f 
accuracy o f sensate description. All else is mere intellectualism, which, as a 
science, is defiant o f the sense o f the intact, and can have no truck with what is 
essentially mystical. The sense of self which is at stake here is not the 
consciously intact self, which is always false because o f necessarily premature
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closure, but the unconsciously intact self, recognised as such by the conscious 
self, and respected as such, because the story o f the apprehension by the 
conscious self o f the unconscious self is the story o f irrevocable change. How 
such change may be the meaning o f the redemption o f the self will be discussed in 
the next and final section.
4. Story as redemptive mediation
Put bluntly, story is an account o f the self by the self to the self. It is crucial to 
realise that the self is an artificial concept, referring to ontic relativity where 
boundaries between individual, other and community are blurred since reference 
to self is always creative as well as quasi-definitive. It is assumed that such an 
account is not done in a private language and is not to be reduced to a 
psychologism. Story and utterance are not to be divorced. The theory of 
condensed sub-vocalisation is relevant to the organic nature o f story, if story is to 
be rooted to the body, and not merely conceptualised as an abstracted series o f 
mental acts.
N arrating is never innocent and the narrative that fram es another allow s the 
writer to dram atize the results o f  the telling. And this no doubt signals to 
the reader that the tale told can and should react on his ow n life: that 
literature is no t inconsequential (Brooks, 1994:77-78).
If  the dynamics o f the self adopt the roles o f writer, reader and narrative, but 
escape the confines o f privacy by being subject to utterance, self-change becomes 
open to scrutiny and discussion. The point o f this section is to offer a point o f 
contact between such articulated change and spirituality. The reason for this is to 
test the sense o f  privacy against the imperative o f  ultimacy. If  story is a product 
o f both the intact and the generous soul, it is the path towards the boundaries o f 
interpretation which are the basis o f value. Here language loses everything 
except aesthetic value.
... is there possible experience pre- or non-linguistic? If  I w ere put to it I 
should argue that although m ost o f  what enters experience is not m erely 
linguistic, w hatever enters experience does so in and w ith language, that in 
this sense we inhabit the w orld linguistically. But even i f  we grant that we 
m ay experience som ething in the utter absence o f  language: still, i f  an 
experienced present is not sim ply a disassociated  ‘no w ’ but contains a 
vestige o f  m em ory and a leaning into anticipation, then  an incip ient 
narrative form  will be im plicit in it, o f  w hich narrative language is the 
irreducible linguistic expression. H ow ever we settle the question  about 
non-linguistic experience, there is still an intim ate relation betw een story­
telling and the aesthetic  form  o f  experience itse lf (C rites in W iggins, 
1985:32).
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The link between story and spirituality contains elements both o f poetics and 
aesthetics in the foundational quest for redemption of awareness. Such redemp­
tion is not seen here as some kind o f quasi-theological abstraction, but as a 
coherent but rare intuition o f the dynamics o f vitalist depth. The vehicle o f 
language in this regard is not fruitful if  used in a purely intellectualist way: the 
details o f spiritual awareness, teased out into story, offer not dogma but 
recognition of individuality and singularity against the backdrop o f communality. 
The argument here is that it is precisely such recognition that is the closest 
understanding o f what story is. When one experiences the sense that one is 
known, to another, to oneself, even to the Divine, one is changed. When the 
therapeutic values o f story are served, not only individual awareness but also 
communal awareness is offered a moment o f irrevocable change, the essence of 
which is potent generosity, the highway of hope. It may not be denied that the 
zone between the writer and the reader is hazardous, and that misinterpretation is 
unavoidable. But this may be put down to immaturity o f spiritual formation rather 
than paucity of meaningfulness. In any case, meaningfulness is no abstraction of 
experience, but indeed, too detailed to be apprehended -  let alone comprehended 
in a purely intellectualist way. The affirmation which is made here is that story 
and spiritual formation are co-dependent. Spiritual formation in this sense refers 
to that change which happens conjointly with utterance o f that which is 
unconscious or secret to the individual. In other words, that which is intact, that 
which may be deconstructed and that which is narrated have in common an 
unknown area o f potential revelation. This area is not only unknown but also 
unknowable since revelation is not epistemic but prophetic. Here at last is the 
clear link between prophetic language and redemption. Again, the basic 
argument is that story is concerned with change, and change in turn with 
individual awareness. The crucial issue is the narrative that expresses the change, 
in ways which are both oblique and clear. Whereas the latter is accessible to the 
intellect, the former is organically shrouded in visceral experience. Story, the 
Gestalt which encompasses the entire organic experience, portrays and hides the 
mysterium  but allows, within this paradox, endless possibility o f sequence and 
image. It is this possibility to which awareness is called, and to declare in acts 
and utterances o f courage the realisation o f life in the created order.
It may be said, then, that story is that which mediates between the self and the 
world. In itself, story holds promise of creation, but not without the risk that 
attends the creative act. Its redemptive action is implied in its metaphoric play 
and especially in its fluency o f value impact. The parables o f the New Testament 
are a case in point. It is instructive to note that the very incarnation o f the Divine 
life taught by means o f story. To hammer home the point, the story o f the 
crucifiction and resurrection is best approached not by resorting to classifications 
either o f fact or fiction, but by participation in the passion and promise o f the 
Divine love which is both revealed and hidden within a fathomless grace.
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